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Introduction 
Are you phenomenally conscious of the sensation of your clothes against your skin? Surely you are 
now, but were you before you read the question? Or, did you only begin to experience the tactile 
sensation of your clothes once you directed attention to it? People differ widely in their intuitions on 
the matter (Schwitzgebel 2011). Regardless, this simple exercise goes a long way towards motivating 
and bringing to light a rough, first approximation of the question this paper will be concerned with: 
Is attention necessary for phenomenal consciousness? Cognitive scientists have discovered 
phenomena such as inattentional blindness and change blindness in which subjects fail to report even 
glaringly incongruous objects that are not attended to, suggesting that their reported lack of 
phenomenology is caused by their inattention (Simons & Levin 1997). On the other hand, some 
experiments, along with some of our strongest intuitions, suggest that we may be conscious of much 
more than we direct attention to, which is what Ned Block calls phenomenal overflow (Block 2007).  
In this paper, I will ask whether attention is necessary for consciousness, and after weighing the 
evidence, I answer in the affirmative. 
First, let me define my terms. Ned Block first introduced “access consciousness” in opposition 
to the more familiar, phenomenal, usage of “consciousness” (Block 1995). Phenomenal consciousness 
is the subjective, experiential, “what-it-is-like” quality of an experience while access consciousness is 
the voluntary and rational (as opposed to automatic) use of information in cognition. The question 
then becomes whether a dissociation can be drawn between these two types of consciousness. In 
particular, I will focus my discussion on whether it is possible for phenomenal consciousness to be 
present in the absence of access consciousness. There is some confusion about whether access 
consciousness should be understood dispositionally or categorically. In other words, does information 
merely have to be accessible or does it have to be accessed in order to be access conscious (Carruthers 
2015)? Following Block (2011), I will assume the latter, stronger, interpretation. This is because I take 
it to be a more philosophically interesting question whether or not representations that are not 
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accessed (but may or may not be accessible) at time t1 can still be phenomenally conscious at time t1. 
This is the reading Block gives when he argues that simply because representations “are not accessed 
is not to say that any are inaccessible” (Block 2011). So, phenomenal overflow is a dissociation of 
phenomenal consciousness from access, not accessibility. 
I will focus my discussion on one particular access mechanism that has received the most 
interest in the literature: attention.1 On the standard account, attention is a kind of filter that allows 
important perceptual information to be accessed, or made available for global processing. That is to 
say, attention is trivially linked to access consciousness. Attention can be bottom-up, as when it is 
automatically drawn towards a salient object in a visual scene, or top-down, as when it is consciously 
and intentionally directed towards an object or area of a visual scene (Srinivasan et al. 2009). The 
attentional “filter” allows us to focus our processing on the contextually relevant stimuli and typically 
results in enhanced information processing and better performance on a given task (Srinivasan et al. 
2009). 
For the remainder of this paper I will use “phenomenal consciousness overflowing attention” 
interchangeably with “phenomenology overflowing access.” The line of argument I pursue in the 
paper is meant to directly answer Ned Block’s arguments for overflow. However, the latter 
terminology, on Block’s view, technically implies a broader category of phenomena than the former 
since attention is merely one of many access mechanisms. The only access mechanism that this paper 
will be concerned with is attentional access. At this point, before my argument has even gotten off the 
ground, Block might object that we are talking past each other. If Block is concerned with a plurality 
of access mechanisms and my argument is only directed at one of them then I have will not have 
refuted Block’s argument for overflow. However, I think this focus on attention can be motivated for 
two reasons. Firstly, as we shall see, all of Block’s positive arguments for overflow, and most notably 
the Sperling (1960) paradigm, hinge on some form of visual attention. Thus, in the absence of reasons 
to accept that Block’s arguments generalize to other access mechanisms, by showing that phenomenal 
consciousness does not overflow attention I will have undercut the motivation for Block’s view.2 
Secondly, the literature on overflow has converged on attention as the most interesting access 
mechanism in the visual modality that could plausibly be implicated in the kind of global broadcasting 
and availability that is the hallmark of access consciousness (Brigard & Prinz 2010, Cohen & Dennett 
2011, Woodman & Luck 2003). Thus, in the context of arguments concerning phenomenal overflow 
in the visual modality, and specifically the arguments put forward by Block (2007, 2011), attention is 
the access mechanism in question. So, although my arguments do not show that phenomenal overflow 
never occurs, they do undercut the main motivation for positing overflow in the first place. In other 
words, I will argue against Block by way of showing that phenomenal consciousness is commensurate 
with attention. 
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There are a number of methodological, epistemic, and theoretical implications that the 
relationship between phenomenal consciousness and attention might have for philosophy and 
cognitive science. For example, it may be important to the methodology of how consciousness is 
studied. If some phenomenally conscious states can be inaccessible or otherwise unaccessed, then 
traditional methodologies employed in cognitive science such as self-report and voluntary action may 
be bypassing or otherwise overlooking certain conscious states of interest (Cohen & Dennett 2011). 
The very fact that there is a debate over phenomenal overflow may also call into question the reliability 
of introspection. After all, either our introspective intuition of rich phenomenology is incorrect or we 
have conscious representations that cannot be accessed by introspection alone. It is surprising that 
such radically different hypotheses about what we consciously experience are seemingly irresolvable 
by introspection alone (Schwitzgebel 2011). Another epistemic upshot of the relationship between 
phenomenal consciousness and attention is the role attention might play in justifying our beliefs. 
Given the intuitive plausibility of the role of phenomenally conscious experiences in justifying 
perceptual beliefs, then attention may or may not be a necessary condition for perceptual justification 
(Siegel & Silins 2014). Perhaps most centrally, the relationship between consciousness and attention 
clearly has major implications for the cognitive and neural architecture of consciousness. Theories of 
consciousness such as the higher-order thought theory and global workspace theory, both of which 
posit that unaccessed representations cannot be conscious, will stand or fall with the question of 
overflow (Dretske 2007, Brigard & Prinz 2010, Carruthers 2015). If mental states can be phenomenally 
conscious independent of their being accessed, then phenomenal consciousness is a first-order 
property of certain mental states that does not depend on any higher-order states or global availability. 
In this paper, I will argue that we do not have good reasons to accept arguments for the 
possibility of consciousness without attention and that, in fact, attention is necessary for 
consciousness. In order to do this, I will first present the strongest arguments for consciousness 
overflowing attention. Then I will show that there are tenable alternatives to these arguments that 
explain the same data without positing unattended conscious states, thereby undercutting any reason 
to accept overflow in the absence of further arguments. The key to this argument is that unconscious 
visual processing possesses the same explanatory power as conscious visual processing in interpreting 
that data. Next, I will develop one of these alternatives to overflow that accounts for our intuition of 
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Arguments for Overflow 
 
Ned Block, one of the staunchest advocates of overflow, draws much of his empirical support from 
a 1960 experiment by George Sperling (Block 2007, Block 2011). In it, subjects were shown a 3x4 
matrix of letters for 50 milliseconds (ms). In control experiments subjects could only report up to four 
letters, or a third of the matrix. The reported letters were randomly distributed throughout the matrix. 
On the experimental trials a tone was played after the stimulus disappeared that indicated to the 
subjects which row of the matrix they had to report. The tone was played after the visual display 
disappeared so as not to draw attention to any particular area of the matrix beforehand. This is known 
as a retro-cue. Surprisingly, subjects were able to report on average all four symbols in the signaled 
row after the retro-cue. The fact that the row was retro-cued makes these results significant, for the 
matrix was not present for the subjects to consult and attention could not be directed to the cued row 
beforehand. These results did not change as a function of how long the stimulus was presented, as 
long as it was kept between .015 and .500 seconds (Sperling 1960). This experiment has been replicated 
with 32 alphanumeric characters (Sligte et al. 2008). 
The object limit for working memory, as determined by the non-cued results, is approximately 
four (Block 2007).3 However, subjects’ ability to report the entire cued row without directing attention 
to it until after the display disappeared is initially inexplicable. Since subjects were not able to simply 
look at the display and report what they saw after the cue, and since the control trials indicated that 
subjects were only able to remember four random symbols out of the whole display, Block argues that 
subjects must have had a phenomenally conscious representation of the whole display in iconic 
memory that was being consulted in order to report the entire row (Block 2007). If this is true, then 
this paradigm provides a clear example of consciousness (of the whole matrix) overflowing attentional 
access (of merely the single row of letters).4 Crucially, this argument relies on the fact that subjects 
“insist that they have seen more than they can remember afterwards” which seems to indicate that 
there was conscious phenomenology that could not be accessed (Sperling 1960). Notice that there is 
a trivial way of interpreting the Sperling paradigm that posits that subjects saw the entire matrix but 
simply forgot it. We forget things all the time; why is this surprising? Once again, the answer lies in 
the fact that subjects’ ability to report 100% of the retro-cued row while only being able to report 
approximately 33% of the entire matrix. Subjects’ ability to reproduce 100% of the retro-cued row 
without consulting any presently available visual information provides evidence that subjects had a 
conscious representation of 100% of the matrix.  
Advocates of overflow also rely on a study by Landman et al. 2003, in which the partial report 
paradigm exemplified in Sperling (1960) is extended to change blindness stimuli, in order to dispute 
interpretations of change blindness paradigms that posit a necessary link between attention and 
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consciousness (Block 2007, Block 2011). In this experiment subjects are briefly shown a circle of eight 
rectangles in either a horizontal or vertical orientation. Then, after a brief pause, another display of 
eight rectangles is shown which is identical except for one rectangle that differs in orientation. 
Ordinarily observers are not able to report this change in orientation. However, when one of the eight 
rectangles is cued in the interval between the termination of the first display and the onset of the 
second display, subjects are able to accurately report the change (Landman et. al. 2003). This suggests 
that subjects possess a detailed conscious representation of the entire first display despite not directing 
attention to any particular area of it. Importantly, both Sperling (1960) and Landman et al. (2003) 
suggest that not only are subjects conscious that there are letters or rectangles, but that they are 
conscious of the identity or orientation of those letters or rectangles, meaning that their conscious 
representations are in fact reasonably rich in detail. 
Another experiment that supposedly shows a dissociation between phenomenology and 
attention uses an object-substitution masking paradigm (Woodman & Luck 2003). In this 
experimental paradigm the presence of a stimulus is masked by quickly replacing it with another object, 
leaving subjects unable to report the presence of the first stimulus. In this particular experiment, the 
display consists of a target stimulus (e.g. a square) surrounded by four small dots and a large number 
of distracting stimuli (e.g. many triangles) (Woodman & Luck 2003). All of the stimuli disappear after 
a brief exposure and subjects are asked to report whether or not the target stimulus is present in the 
display. The experimenters argue that lateralized measures of brain activity in the visual cortex while 
viewing the display show that subjects did in fact perceive the target stimulus.5 And, as predicted by 
the brain activity, when the stimuli all disappear at the same time subjects are relatively accurate in 
reporting the presence of the target stimuli.  
However, in delayed offset trials in which the four small dots surrounding the target stimulus 
persist after the rest of the stimuli disappear, accuracy in determining whether or not the target 
stimulus was present is impaired relative to trials in which the target and the dots disappear at the 
same time, while the lateralized visual cortex activity that is taken to indicate phenomenal 
consciousness remains the same. Importantly, in the delayed offset trials, by the time attention reaches 
the target it has already disappeared with only the four dots remaining. According to the 
experimenters’ interpretation, attending to these four dots overwrites whatever phenomenal 
representation subjects had of the target stimulus (Woodman & Luck 2003). The delayed offset trials 
are an example of what is plausibly interpreted as visual consciousness as measured by brain activity 
in the absence of attention as measured by verbal report. Put differently, although subjects were unable 
to attend to and report the presence of the target, lateralized brain activity shows that it must have 
been phenomenally conscious.  
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Why Posit Phenomenal Consciousness? 
 
The three preceding arguments are taken to support the existence of representations that are 
phenomenally conscious in the absence of attention. In this section I will argue that phenomenal 
consciousness is not needed in order to formulate viable interpretations of the empirical data. That is, 
representations that are phenomenally unconscious until they are attended to can perform the same 
explanatory function as phenomenally conscious representations for each of the aforementioned 
experimental paradigms. 
For example, positing consciousness beyond attention is not the only way to interpret the 
Sperling partial report paradigm. In particular, there is little reason to think that subjects’ 
representation of the matrix before the retro-cue is phenomenally conscious. Perhaps subjects are able 
to report the cued rows because they have an unconscious representation of the identities of the 
letters. The retro cue then causes subjects to attend to the relevant portion of that representation, 
pulling the identities of those letters into (phenomenal and access) consciousness (Cohen & Dennett 
2011). The advocate of overflow might respond with the fact that subjects reported that they 
experienced more than they could report. Thus, subjects were phenomenally conscious of the whole 
matrix despite only directing attention to the retro-cued row. However, this reply does not account 
for the fact that in order to report their experience of the whole matrix, subjects must have had some 
access to this experience. Perhaps they only saw that there were objects that could potentially be identified 
if attention were directed at them, which does not implicate overflow. I will develop this reply further 
in the next section. For now, all I mean to establish is that there is a viable way to interpret the Sperling 
paradigm without positing overflow. Thus, the Sperling experiment is not decisive evidence in favor 
of overflow. 
Neither does the change blindness paradigm in Landman et al. (2003) decisively support 
overflow in the way Block and others think it does (Block 2007). The cue that appeared in between 
the change might not only have cued subjects to which rectangle in the second display to focus on, 
but also have acted as a retro-cue, causing participants to attend to an area of their representation of 
the previous display which is stored in iconic memory. As with the Sperling paradigm, there is no 
reason to suppose that their representation of the first display is conscious at the point of the cue. The 
results are just as easily explained by the cue pulling the representation of the rectangle into 
phenomenal consciousness in virtue of attention being directed at it.  
The object-substitution masking paradigm is also susceptible to alternative, non-overflow 
interpretations. The experimenters establish that attention is directed to the area of the target only 
after the target disappears (Woodman & Luck 2003). Thus, the delayed offset trials might result in 
lower accuracy because attention only reaches the area of the target stimulus after it has already 
disappeared. Since the dots have a delayed offset, subjects attend to the dots instead. Attending to the 
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dots allows the subject to consciously perceive them while overwriting any representation of the target 
stimulus due to the working memory limit. What reason do we have to believe that this experiment is 
decisive in showing that the target stimulus was consciously perceived? After all, conditions such as 
blindsight show that visual information processing can take place without accompanying phenomenal 
consciousness.6 One might object that the brain-imaging results of activity in the visual cortex implies 
that subjects were phenomenally conscious of the target. However, the fact that there was brain 
activity correlated with perception is still ambiguous between conscious and unconscious perception. 
None of the reviewed experimental paradigms are able to tease apart these two possible 
interpretations. At best, overflow is merely one way to explain the data.  
Ironically, Block and other proponents of overflow have fallen prey to the very confusion 
between phenomenology and function that the distinction between phenomenal and access 
consciousness was introduced to correct. Proponents of overflow seem to implicitly endorse the 
bridge principle that phenomenal consciousness is present wherever we are able to perform well on 
visual tasks. For example, on their view, subjects’ ability to report the retro-cued rows in the Sperling 
experiment is a good indicator of the presence of phenomenal consciousness. But, of course, a 
philosophical zombie without any phenomenology would have this same ability. So, this bridge 
principle is implausible.  
The ability of phenomenally unconscious representations to explain the partial report 
phenomena finds support in the distinction by Dehaene et al. (2006) between preconscious and 
(phenomenally) conscious visual processing. Preconscious visual processing occurs when visual 
information that is unaccessed and processed below the level of phenomenal consciousness can still 
be accessible even after the stimulus disappears. Thus, it is possible for visual information about the 
Sperling matrix to be processed outside of attention and without phenomenal consciousness and for 
the retro-cue to then cause that unconscious representation to be accessed and pulled into working 
memory. This interpretation finds further support in a study that retro-cued attention after a stimulus 
has already disappeared (Sergent et al. 2013). Like the paradigms mentioned above, the retro-cue 
enhances subjects’ performance in identifying the target stimulus. However, subjective ratings of 
stimulus visibility support an interpretation in which attention that is directed post-stimulus actually 
generates a phenomenally conscious perception of the stimuli, rather than merely improving memory 
of an already phenomenally conscious percept (Sergent et al. 2013).  
At this point I should clarify that what I have said so far is not meant to disprove the possibility 
of consciousness beyond attention. The partial-report, change blindness, and object-substitution 
masking experimental paradigms might be explained as instances of overflow. However, their 
experimental design is, unfortunately, ambiguous on this matter. It is uncontroversial that in order for 
subjects to be as successful as they were, information processing must have taken place beyond focal 
attention.7 However, I have shown that it is not clear whether this information processing resulted in 
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phenomenology or not. This is crucial: the fact that phenomenal consciousness cannot necessarily be 
identified with function (i.e., the ability to perform well in the experiments described above) undercuts 
any motivation for accepting overflow. Indeed, there are studies that lend prima facie support to the 
competing, non-overflow interpretation. In the next section, I will answer a potential objection to my 
argument here while laying out a positive, yet tentative, proposal for the relationship of attention and 
consciousness that can account for the empirical data and the intuitions philosophers like Block rely 
on in their arguments for overflow without positing consciousness beyond attention. 
 
Seeming Richness and the Feature-Integration Theory of Attention 
 
So far I have argued that unconscious representations have the same explanatory power as conscious 
representations in interpreting experiments commonly cited to support consciousness without 
attention such as Sperling (1960), Landman et al. (2003), and Woodman & Luck (2003). However, the 
proponent of overflow might object that I have ignored one of the most important pieces of evidence: 
introspective reports of detailed and complete phenomenology. Remember that subjects in the 
Sperling paradigm “commonly assert that they can see more than they can report” (Sperling 1960, 
emphasis original). In the Landman et al. (2003) paradigm it seems absurd to assert that subjects 
literally did not see anything in the first display until the retro-cue. Surely all the subjects consciously 
experienced an array of rectangles, even if they could not report each of their particular orientations. 
This intuition of rich phenomenology probably lies behind experimental findings that subjects 
systematically overestimate their performance in change blindness paradigms (Levin et. al. 2000). This 
is not to mention that in everyday experiences it seems as though we are phenomenally conscious of 
much more than we could ever hope to report. It certainly seems as if I am not blind to the area 
outside of my focal attention. Perhaps when taken together, introspective reports of phenomenal 
richness, coupled with subjects’ performance in the experiments discussed above, are evidence enough 
for consciousness without attention. 
Yet, Block and others who rely on the intuition of seeing more than one can report fail to 
recognize the implications of the fact that subjects in the Sperling experiment were able to report that 
they saw something. The mere fact that subjects were able to report that they had a rich perceptual 
experience of the entire display shows that the matrix was not entirely inaccessible to them. This is 
because the ability to introspectively report entails access and therefore can never be used as evidence 
for inaccessible phenomenal states. By relying on access to determine subjects’ phenomenology, Block 
has failed to show a dissociation between these two types of consciousness. For this stumbling block 
to be avoided a phenomenal representation must be discovered that is unable to be accessed via 
introspective report. It is for this very reason that the complicated experimental paradigms described 
above were crafted in the first place. 
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Taking subjects’ reports at face value, it is important to tease apart precisely what sort of 
conscious phenomenology the subjects in the Sperling experiment had of the array. David Papineau 
distinguishes between scene and item phenomenology (Papineau 2007). Papineau calls 
phenomenology of the display as a whole without detailed representations of the individual letters 
scene phenomenology. The subjects’ reports of seeing the whole display indicate that they had scene 
phenomenology. What is at issue is whether or not subjects had rich phenomenology of each of the 
letters in the display. Papineau calls this item phenomenology (Papineau 2007). Not being able to 
report an experience does not mean it is inaccessible (presumably language deficits do not affect 
consciousness). However, being able to report something does entail access. Subjects clearly had 
access to their experience of the array as a whole, given their reports. Their inability to report the 
identities of every letter in the array, on the other hand, shows that they lack access to the specific 
alphanumerical identities of the symbols. So, subjects had scene phenomenology and scene access 
without item access. Whether phenomenal overflow occurs hinges on whether subjects had item 
phenomenology. 
The distinction between scene and item phenomenology is quite intuitive. For example, you 
can probably recall a case where you laid your eyes upon a scene briefly and saw various colors, shapes, 
lighting, motion, and depth. Only afterwards were you able to piece these together into distinct objects. 
You might also imagine viewing an impressionist painting and at first only being able to see the various 
brushstrokes (the scene) before being able to understand how they form the objects (the items) that 
the artist intended. The converse can also be true; one might have access to high-level representations 
without access to low-level representations. An example of this might be getting the gist, or meaning, 
of a picture without seeing the individual perceptual contents that made it up. That these examples 
are hard to come by suggests just how closely phenomenology and access map on to each other in 
most situations. 
So scene and item phenomenology can be conceptually distinguished, but can they truly come 
apart in practice? If they can, what cognitive mechanisms lie behind this process? Empirical results 
largely support dissociations between different levels of phenomenology (Kouider et al. 2007). On a 
plausible but controversial interpretation, patients with type-2 blindsight have degraded 
phenomenology such that they are able to report that they saw something without being aware of any 
determinate features of their phenomenology (Brogaard 2015, Overgaard et. al. 2008, for an opposing 
view see Weiskrantz 2009). This is plausibly interpreted as an instance of scene phenomenology 
without item phenomenology. More empirical backing for this distinction is found in patients with 
integrative visual agnosia. Integrative agnosiacs are “impaired at search tasks that require the binding 
of visual elements in a spatially parallel manner across a field containing multiple stimuli” (Behrmann 
& Kimchi 2003). That is, although they may be aware of the various features present in a visual scene 
they are unable to integrate those features into coherent objects. When patients with integrative 
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agnosia are shown two differently colored letters and are asked to name the color of the first letter 
they see, they will often report the color of the other letter (Treisman 1998). This is taken to show 
that agnosiac patients are conscious of the various colors and letters that are present, but are impaired 
at binding the colors and letters together into objects.  
Importantly, these very same binding errors occur in neurotypical subjects who are prevented 
from focusing attention on any of the colored letters in particular through the use of brief presentation 
and distractor objects (Treisman 1998). The importance of attention for binding features is also 
suggested by the asymmetry in search times when looking for a shape with an added feature (searching 
for a Q among O’s) compared to a shape that lacks that same feature (searching for an O among Q’s). 
The latter requires binding the tails to each Q while the former merely requires searching for the one 
feature that stands out (Treisman 1998). It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the extensive 
evidence for the feature-integration theory of attention. However, the evidence reviewed above 
suggests that it is a live, and likely, hypothesis that attention is necessary for binding features into 
objects.  
The feature-integration theory of attention empirically fleshes out the conceptual distinction 
between scene and item phenomenology, especially in the context of the Sperling (1960) and Landman 
et al. (2003) experiments. In particular, we can operationalize the pre-attentive features as scene 
phenomenology and perception of the post-attentive objects as item phenomenology.8 The feature-
integration theory of attention can help to make sense of subjects’ performance on experiments such 
as Sperling (1960) along with their intuitions of rich phenomenology without positing consciousness 
beyond attention. During the brief display of the Sperling matrix subjects are able to make out the 
various features present in the matrix. This explains subjects’ ability to characterize the display as 
containing only letters, as well as their intuition of seeing more than they can report. Once the retro-
cue is administered attention is directed to an area of the matrix and the features within that area are 
bound into objects before the representation of the matrix decays. This explains subjects’ abilities to 
accurately report any cued row without consulting a rich, phenomenally conscious representation of 
the entire matrix. The representation only becomes phenomenally conscious and richly detailed once 
the retro-cue directs attention to a portion of it.  
This interpretation finds support from an experiment which replicated the Sperling paradigm 
while also introducing “pseudo-letters” in non-cued rows (de Gardelle et al. 2009). Subjects were led 
to expect either real letters or very different symbols (such as a star or a face) in the array. Using free 
subjective report researchers found that not only was it the case that “pseudo-letters were hardly 
noticed” but often “participants actually tended to perceive the pseudo-letters as real letters,” or, at 
least, subjects reported seeing pseudo-letters as real letters (de Gardelle et al. 2009). Why is this 
significant? Imagine for example, that while reading an ordinary text you saw this symbol: “Ƨ”, instead 
of “S” in the middle of a word. This pseudo-letter would undoubtedly stand out to you as being out 
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of the ordinary. We should expect the same of the de Gardelle et al. (2009) subjects if they had rich 
phenomenology. That subjects were unable to do this indicates that their phenomenology cannot have 
been as richly detailed as Block posits. 
Importantly for my account, the feature-integration theory of attention can explain why 
pseudo-letters were often mistaken for their actual counterparts. Pseudo-letters share nearly all of the 
same low-level features as actual letters. For example, Ƨ is made up of the same curved lines as S. Since 
pseudo-letters only occurred outside of cued rows, subjects never bound the features together. Then, 
because subjects were primed to expect only real letters, they inferred that the presence of the features 
indicated the presence of a real-letter instead of a pseudo-letter. Thus, de Gardelle et al. (2009) 
demonstrates an illusory conjunction outside of attention in a very similar way to Treisman (1998). 
This suggests that subjects did not so much directly perceive the Sperling matrix as reconstruct it after 
the cue based on the guiding assumption that the features present should combine to form letters. 
Sperling (1960) is not a case of perception without attention but rather a case of attention (coupled 
with top-down assumptions) guiding perception.9 
The defender of overflow might object that I have conceded their point. Since my account 
entails that conscious perception of features can occur outside of focal attention, my argument has in 
fact established the possibility of scene phenomenology overflowing attention. This is a weaker form 
of overflow than the kind of rich, item phenomenology without attention that most proponents of 
overflow, including Block, argue for, but it is a potential counterexample to my argument nonetheless. 
In what follows, I will give three reasons for why this supposed case of overflow is not a 
counterexample to my claim that attention is necessary for consciousness.  
First, as discussed above, the mere fact that subjects are able to report the fact that they have 
scene phenomenology beyond merely the cued items entails that they have some sort of access to it, 
attentional or otherwise. If subjects truly had phenomenology of the display that was not access 
conscious then they should not be able to report it at all because verbal report indicates the ability to 
voluntarily and rationally make use of information: the hallmark of accessibility (Block 1995). The fact 
that they were able to report the mere impression of having seen the whole display shows that their 
scene phenomenology was accessed.  
Second, all the feature-integration theory of attention posits is perception of features outside 
of focal attention. There is converging evidence for the presence of distributed attention throughout 
most of the visual field (Srinivasan et al. 2009). Distributed attention is weaker than focal attention 
and picks up different kinds of visual information than focal attention, such as global statistical 
properties of a scene (Srinivasan et al. 2009). So, the phenomenal awareness of the scene that subjects 
reported in all of the experimental paradigms under discussion may result from distributed attention 
to items outside of focal attention (Srinivasan et al. 2009, Brigard & Prinz 2010, Cohen & Dennett 
2011). Lending support to this interpretation, Cohen et al. (2011) found that when a distractor task 
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such as multiple object tracking was sufficiently demanding, inattentional blindness to the scene 
occurred. The experimenters used natural scenes such as animals or mountains in order to maximize 
ecological validity and found that scene perception decreased as the demands of the task increased 
(Cohen et al. 2011). The experimenters interpret this result as showing that studies which claim to 
show phenomenal consciousness beyond attention have not sufficiently engaged all attentional 
resources. The leftover attentional resources can then attend to the scene in the form of distributed 
attention (Cohen et al. 2011). It is distributed attention that allows the scene to be perceived along 
with focal attention which binds features together and allows for the report of specific items in 
paradigms such as Sperling (1960) and Landman et al. (2003). 
Finally, there are a wealth of studies in the vision science literature that suggest that humans 
can perceive statistical regularities in our environments with very little attentional demand (Cohen et 
al. 2016, Greene & Oliva 2009, Srinivasan et al. 2009). In other words, just because attention is a 
necessary condition for consciousness, and just because attention has a limited capacity, does not 
necessarily mean that our conscious experience is sparse. This doesn’t just accord with the intuitions 
of the Sperling subjects who insisted that they consciously perceived the entire matrix of letters, but 
it also validates our everyday experience. The idea is that, when presented with a densely speckled hen, 
instead of consciously representing each speckle individually, we simply represent that there is an 
ensemble of speckles, thereby condensing what would have been many bits of information that would 
have placed a high demand on our attentional resources into a single bit of information that is not as 
attentionally demanding. This ability allows us to get the “gist” of a visual scene without representing 
individual objects and seems to be importantly related and, indeed, may be integral to the formation 
of scene phenomenology. Focal attention might give us a “high-resolution” picture of the individual 
speckles, but it does not need to be present in order to represent the ensemble property.  
Importantly, phenomenal consciousness of global statistics and ensemble properties does not 
exceed the limits of attention. As described above, inattentional blindness to the scene occurs as 
attentional demand increases (Cohen et al. 2011). Additionally, “observers are more accurate at 
processing multiple ensembles when they are presented sequentially, rather than simultaneously,” 
suggesting that they use up a limited pool of attentional resources (Cohen et al. 2016). Our ability to 
quickly represent ensembles even with only limited attentional allocation, along with the presence of 
distributed attention, is consistent with the feature-integration theory of attention and fully explains 
the intuition of seeing more letters than one can report without positing consciousness beyond 
attention. So, neither scene nor item phenomenology overflow attention. Each type of 
phenomenology has distinct attentional mechanisms, focal and distributed; high-resolution and gist, 
that allow visual scenes to be consciously perceived. 
The feature-integration theory elaborated above, coupled with phenomena like distributed 
attention and perception of ensemble properties can help defuse some of the more recent studies 
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thought to support overflow. For example, one study replicated the Sperling experiment with colored 
letters (Bronfman et al. 2014). The level of color diversity was varied both in the cued and the non-
cued rows.  The experimenters found that subjects could accurately estimate the level of color diversity 
outside of the cued row with no cost to letter report. This is taken to show that subjects had color 
phenomenology outside of focal attention and without any addition to working memory load 
(Bronfman et al. 2014). However, my account can circumvent this interpretation, and indeed, 
comfortably accommodate these results. This is because high color diversity implicates the presence 
of a variety of different features. In fact, accurate color diversity judgments could be made based on 
an awareness of color features alone, which according to the feature-integration theory can be 
registered pre-attentively. On top of this, color diversity is an ensemble property that can be registered 
with very little attention necessary (although not without any attention). In other words, subjects do 
not need a rich representation of each individual colored letter in order to accurately estimate color 
diversity. This study, far from being evidence for overflow, actually demonstrates one way in which 
we can access a wealth of visual information without recourse to a rich phenomenal representation 




In the preceding sections I have argued that attention is a necessary condition of consciousness. The 
various arguments that have been put forward for phenomenal overflow are inconclusive insofar as 
they can be reinterpreted without positing overflow. The feature-integration theory of attention, 
coupled with distributed attention and perception of ensemble properties, can account for the 
intuition of phenomenal richness as well as subjects’ performance in paradigms such as Sperling (1960) 
and Landman et al. (2003) without positing consciousness beyond attention. Thus, arguments for 
phenomenal overflow are at best inconclusive or at worst ignore important experimental findings 
concerning attention and therefore do not stand up to empirical scrutiny. There are important 
questions that future research must grapple with such as whether phenomenal overflow poses a 
methodological threat to a science of consciousness (Block 2011, Cohen & Dennett 2011). This paper 
has focused on synthesizing and interpreting the vast empirical literature on attention and 
consciousness and has tentatively proposed that attention as a necessary condition for consciousness 










1 There is an interesting literature on whether attention is sufficient for consciousness (Brigard & Prinz 
2010, Kentridge et al. 1999, Kentridge et al. 2008, Mole 2014). I will limit my discussion in this paper 
to the question of necessity. 
2 Indeed, as I will go on to show, Block’s arguments for overflow hinge on particular details about 
certain experiments, all of which are in the visual modality and employ very brief exposures, thus 
calling into question their generalizability. 
3 One famous experiment found that the working memory limit is, in fact, approximately seven (Miller 
1956). One potential reason for this discrepancy between the Miller (1956) and the Sperling (1960) 
working memory findings is the relatively much briefer exposure to the Sperling display. 
4 A crucial part of understanding the Sperling experiment that gets overlooked in the literature on 
overflow is that language (including the representation of letters) is processed in specialized language 
modules. In other words, letter cognition and recognition is not a purely perceptual task, it relies on 
other cognitive mechanisms. Therefore, using letters in the Sperling task may not be the best way to 
prove phenomenal overflow, which is supposed to be a purely perceptual phenomenon. There is not 
enough research in this domain to sketch out the implications of this for overflow. 
5 By lateralized brain activity I mean differential activation in the visual cortex that is contralateral to 
the side of the visual field that the target stimulus was present on. This differential visual cortex 
activation provides an implicit measure of visual consciousness of the target. 
6 Ned Block’s argument that blindsight constitutes a deficit of both phenomenal and access 
consciousness is well taken (Block 1995). However, all I need to show is that visual information can 
be processed (not accessed) in the absence of phenomenal consciousness in order to draw a 
dissociation between visual information processing and conscious perception.  
7 More on the distinction between focal and distributed attention later. 
8 From here on I shall use scene phenomenology to mean perception of unbound features and item 
phenomenology to mean perception of bound objects. 
9 Some evidence (Blackmore et al. 1995) suggests that with each attentional refocus that accompanies 
saccadic eye movements we constantly have to reconstruct items out of an ever-changing scene, with 
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